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This thesis is a comparative study of the conditional cash transfer programs in Brazil, 
Chile, and Jamaica to analyze the implementation and effectiveness of each program with 
regard to the social, political, and economic environment of each country. These 
countries have vastly different population demographics, economic characteristics, and 
socio-political problems. However, they each adopted, to a greater or lesser extent, the 
same social welfare policies to combat poverty and income inequality and to enhance 
human capital. 
By conducting a comparative analysis that examines the evolution of conditional 
cash transfer (CCT) program implementation in each country, with a particular emphasis 
on efforts to adapt programs to context, I hope to lay out plainly how these different 
country characteristics have contributed to the variable success of CCTs in achieving 
their goals. 
Each program appears to be a fit for the political and economic make-up of its 
parent country. Additionally, they are critical parts to poverty reduction. However, results 
are mixed on how much the CCTs contribute to improved health and education outcomes.  
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A. BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
Conditional cash transfer programs (CCT) are social welfare mechanisms 
designed to reduce poverty in the short-term with a long-term goal of permanently 
breaking the poverty cycle, while enhancing a nation’s human capital by improving long-
term health and educational outcomes. The programs do this by targeting the poor and 
distributing cash payments to them provided they meet requirements laid out in a contract 
which generally fall into two categories: 1) required school attendance and routine 
checkups at a healthcare facility for children and 2) family development classes for 
parents and routine pre-natal checkups for expecting mothers.  
CCTs made their first appearance in Brazil in the late 1990s at the state level. 
Since then, they have spread to almost all of Latin America, and programs are now 
cropping up in Africa and southern Asia. By keeping children in school and healthy 
instead of working to help supplement family income, there is a better chance they will 
obtain legal, gainful employment or post-secondary education, thus breaking the cycle of 
generational poverty. The parents, many of whom are young single mothers or fathers, 
receive counseling and information from professionals on how best to care for their 
children. Additionally, transferred cash is meant, though not required, to be spent on 
improving the family’s condition by buying more nutritious food, school supplies, and 
clothing.  
Domestically, CCTs are popular, especially among the poor and left-leaning 
sectors of the population, because research shows they have generally been successful at 
appreciably reducing immediate poverty and increasing school attendance rates for 
children. However, criticisms levied at the programs cite the insufficiency of the transfers 




 Additionally, these critics contend, especially in Brazilian cities, that the size 
of the benefit is not enough to entice children of the streets, where they can make more 
money.  
Despite this, successes in Latin America and the Caribbean and the diverse 
political economic contexts in which they exist have made CCTs attractive worldwide. 
This thesis presents a comparative study of CCT program implementation and 
effectiveness in Brazil, Chile, and Jamaica to better understand how, over time and across 
countries, the tailoring of these programs to context affects their relative success. 
In the 1990s, Brazil was a country afflicted by run-away inflation, high 
unemployment, high crime rates, and a growing inequality gap. In an effort to remedy 
these problems, which had an extremely negative impact on the Brazilian economy and 
society, Pres. Fernando Henrique Cardoso instituted a series of social programs targeted 
at the poor. These programs, Bolsa Alimentação (Food Grant), Bolsa Escola (School 
Grant), and Auxílio Gas (Gas Allowance), were designed as individual CCTs in which 
the recipient had to fulfill certain requirements to receive monetary assistance. These 
programs had wide public support, especially among the poor. However, they were 
separate entities with separate bureaucracies. As a result, Cardoso’s successor, Luiz 
Inácio “Lula” da Silva combined them into a single transfer program, Bolsa Família 
(Family Grant). In its 10th year, Bolsa Família is the largest conditional cash transfer 
program in the world, servicing an estimated 50 million people, or one-quarter of the 
Brazilian population.  
Where Brazil’s post-authoritarian mixed economy was plagued by state 
corruption, currency policy, and experienced several false starts throughout the 1990s, 
Chile’s came out of authoritarianism as a model of free-market capitalism. Designed by a 
group of University of Chicago economists, known colloquially as the “Chicago Boys,” 
during the Pinochet regime, it “entailed a massive reduction of state functions, 
                                                 
1 Michael Shifter and Cameron Combs, “The Politics of Poverty: South America’s Conditional Cash 




privatization of state-owned enterprises, deregulation of economic activities, and the 
implementation of the notion of the ‘subsidiary state.’”2 Additionally, they instituted a 
regressive tax policy that sharply decreased low-income wages and social benefits while 
simultaneously concentrating wealth in high-income sectors and increasing inequality. As 
a result, though the Chilean economy did, and continues to, experience steady rates of 
growth, inequality and poverty were high, accounting for 45 % of the population, 28 % of 
who were classified as extremely poor at the end of the dictatorship.
3
 Subsequent 
democratically elected presidents continued the free-market principles of Pinochet, but 
sought to lower poverty. By increases in employment, low inflation, social program 
investment, and an increase in real wages by four percent, the poverty rate was cut to 
13.7% by 2006.
4
 Inequality, however, remained a constant challenge, prompting Chile to 
follow in their fellow Latin American’s footsteps and create their own CCT in 2002 
called Chile Solidario.  
Unlike Chile and Brazil, which have large, fairly diverse economies, Jamaica is a 
small country with limited economic options. With an economy based primarily on 
tourism, remittances, bauxite mining, and agricultural exports, the country has been 
particularly vulnerable to external shocks and shifts in the commodities market. It 
suffered greatly from the drops in tourism from the United States following the 
September 11 attacks and the 2008 global financial crisis. Jamaica’s economy has 
underperformed given its assets, which include a fairly well educated and young 
population, excellent weather and soil, and ample mineral resources. Beginning in the 
mid-1990s, Jamaica has had an average annual growth rate of one percent and an average 
unemployment rate of at least 15 %.
5
 Additionally, the island is saddled with gigantic 
                                                 
2 Silvia Borzutzky, “Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin America and Anti-Poverty Policies in Chile: 
Why is Chile’s Market Economy Unable to Reduce Poverty and Inequality?” Poverty and Public Policy 4, 
no. 1 (March 2012) 6, http://nps.illiad.oclc.org/illiad/illiad.dll?Action=10&Form=75&Value=127182.  
3 Ibid., 7. 
4 Ibid., 6.  
5 Robert Looney, “Is Jamaica Poised for a Turn-Around?,” Foreign Policy, 12 February 2014, 
accessed 31 May 2014, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/02/12/is_jamaica_poised_for_a_turn_around.  
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public debt, amounting to 150 % of GDP, acquired through decades of International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) loans and the inability to meet servicing obligations and economic 
goals. Finally, ineffective and inefficient social programs plague Jamaica. Like Brazil in 
the mid-1990s, Jamaica had multiple social welfare programs and decided to consolidate 
them as a single CCT in 2002 called the Programme for Advancement through Health 
and Education (PATH). 
Brazil, Chile, and Jamaica are a diverse study set. Chile is perhaps one of the most 
capitalist countries in the world. The State has a minuscule footprint on economic activity 
and has privatized many services and enterprises. Brazil, conversely, operates a mixed 
economy with large state-owned enterprises centered on its “national champions,” which 
control many of the major industries. Jamaica is also a free-market economy, but the 
government takes a fairly active role in attracting business to the island. All three 
countries rely heavily on commodities exports for foreign capital inflows, and are 
vulnerable to the whims of the global commodities markets. Brazil and Jamaica have 
very high crime rates while Chile enjoys relative order. Finally, all three countries 
recognize the importance of enhancing human capital and reducing poverty as critical to 
improving their economic performance and for the greater good. As a result, these vastly 
different countries have all looked to CCTs to help accomplish this goal. This study seeks 
to analyze program performance within the political context of each set country to 
determine why the each has achieved differing levels of success. First, I will study the 
conditional requirements of each program, paying particular attention to enforcement. 
Second, the various targeting regimes and registration programs will be examined. Third, 
I will compare measures of effectiveness by examining the effect of each program’s 
effects on developmental measures such as health, education, changes in poverty level 
and inequality. Finally, I will attempt to identify areas for improvement. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Among the greatest challenges for modern capitalist economies are the 
pervasiveness of income inequality and high levels of poverty. As efficiency increases as 
the result of improved deployment of the factors of production, the return to those factors 
 5 
improves. Inequality exists when, according to Thomas Piketty, “the rate of return on 
capital exceeds the rate of growth of output and income . . . capitalism automatically 
generates arbitrary and unsustainable inequalities.”6 In these instances, growing 
percentages of wealth are concentrated in hands of a relatively small proportion of the 
population and states. While inequality is not necessarily a bad thing, as there have 
always been those with more wealth than others, the ever increasing concentration of that 
wealth into a shrinking minorities tends to “radically undermine the meritocratic values 
on which democratic societies are based” and leave an increasing number of people in 
poverty.
7
 Economists and historians have wrestled with these issues for centuries. 
Marxists contend that growing inequality and poverty combined with increasing 
production efficiency, particularly the reduction of human labor and the improvement of 
machines, would result in the means of production being concentrated in the hands of the 
bourgeoisie. The resulting discontent from the proletariat would result in a revolt and 
overthrow of the capitalist system. Adam Smith, on the other hand, believed that a 
minimally regulated free markets would distribute capital and labor in the most efficient 
way, leading to increasing economic surplus that would benefit the entire population, not 
only the owners of capital.  
Karl Polanyi countered Smith’s idea that markets arose spontaneously. Polanyi 
argued that governments create markets and direct and regulate them to protect society 
from the dangers of unrestricted capitalism. He believed that laissez-faire markets 
“undermine the existing social fabric because they turn labor, land, and money—which 
are part of society—into commodities.” The commoditized sectors, labor and the landed, 
would push back against the liberalizing traders in the social protectionist strand of what 
Polanyi called the “double movement” in an effort to protect society.8 
                                                 
6 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014), 1.  
7 Ibid., 1.  
8 Naazneen H. Barma and Steven K. Vogel, The Political Economy Reader: Markets as Institutions, 
ed. Naazneen H. Barma and Steven K. Vogel, (New York: Routledge, 2008), 3.  
 6 
Through this lens, CCTs and other social welfare initiatives represent the modern 
double movement in action. Inequality and poverty have been the subject of protests 
worldwide in the past decade. In Europe and the Americas, the “Occupy Movement” 
brought thousands of protesters into the streets and parks of cities demanding policy 
changes to reduce income inequality and more punitive action against large financial 
institutes viewed as responsible for the 2008 global financial crisis. The income gap was 
a primary issue in the 2012 U.S. presidential election, where President Obama supported 
a tax increases on the wealthy. While the 2008 financial crisis was tough on wealthy 
people and states, it was particularly devastating to the poor, as millions lost their jobs 
and were forced to turn to governments for relief. When the state cannot provide such 
relief, the consequences can be politically, socially, and economically disastrous. The 
tumult of the Arab Spring of 2011, argues Kenneth Pollack, had its roots in economic 
stagnation exacerbated by low human capital, anachronistic education systems, high 
unemployment and underemployment, and foreign investments in the petroleum industry 
that benefited the elite and increased inequality.
9
 Likewise, the violent 2014 protests in 
Venezuela began as a response to anger over extremely high inflation, high poverty, 
criminal violence, and general economic malaise. Finally, income inequality, wage 
dissatisfaction, and poverty resulting from high inflation are main issue in protests that 
have erupted across Brazil in the run-up to the World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics.  
Governments worldwide have recognized the need to lower poverty and increase 
relative incomes in the lower and middle classes, many of them opting to use CCTs as 
their mechanism. Since 2000, over 40 countries and New York City have instituted 
nation-wide or pilot CCTs, the majority of which are in Latin America, the Caribbean, 
and Asia. Combined with the growing popularity of this type of program, the growing 
importance of improving human capital and poverty reduction, and the pervasiveness of 
the income inequality, it has become important for states to understand the costs, benefits, 
and impact CCTs may have of their societies. Additionally, it is critically important for 
                                                 
9 Kenneth M. Pollack et al., The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle 
East, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2011) Kindle Edition, 2–3. 
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policy makers to be able to match the type of CCT with the economic, social, and 
political realities of their nations. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The literature analyzing CCTs worldwide has largely comprised impact 
evaluations focusing on their effectiveness in achieving the dual goals of immediate 
poverty reduction and improving human capital for the long-term. Based on these studies, 
authors have concluded that they are generally successful, especially with regard to 
poverty reduction, but have ample room for improvement. These sorts of evaluation 
studies dominate the literature, and provide valuable information, especially with the 
explosion of new programs in Africa and Asia. However, because they focus almost 
exclusively on the programs, they ignore the individual environments in which CCTs 
operate and how they influence program success. I hope to contribute to the literature by 
providing a more contextual examination of CCT program implementation over time and 
across countries. 
I hypothesize that the success of CCTs depends not just on how well they are 
designed and implemented, but also in terms of their fit with the political, social, and 
economic characteristics of the country in which they operate. In short, CCTs are not  
“one size fits all” entities that can be seamlessly transplanted from one country to 
another. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Analysis of CCTs has grown as their popularity worldwide has grown. The area in 
which the most study has been done is to examine the impact of CCTs on two main 
measures of effectiveness – the impact on education and health of children – of most 
programs, with explanatory factors centering on their means of targeting and modes of 
implementation. The World Bank, which helps finance several CCT programs has taken a 
keen interest. A 2003 study conducted by analysts Laura B. Rawlings and Gloria M. 
Rubio evaluated CCTs in Latin America and the Caribbean as many of them were first 
being implemented. The authors reviewed the “experience in evaluating the impact of 
CCT programs . . . exploring the application of experimental and quasi-experimental 
 8 
methods” and drew conclusions regarding the “welfare impact of this type of program.”10 
They also examined how the evaluations influenced policy making. Since they were 
studying some CCTs at the beginning stages, the authors limited their case set to what 
they called “first generation” programs in Brazil, Honduras, Mexico, and Nicaragua. 
Rawlings and Rubio found that each program gauged their performance based on six 
factors: 1) the adequacy of program administrative bureaucracy, 2) reach into target 
demographic, 3) the existence of predicted impact, 4) unexpected effects, 5) recipient 
perception of the program, and 6) cost-effectiveness.
11
 They concluded, first, that 
evaluations of the programs were grounded in solid evidence. Second, there was “clear 
evidence of program success in increasing enrollment rates, improving preventive health 
care and raising household consumption.”12 Third, the evaluations were provided policy 
makers with sufficient empirical data to make decisions about program expansion and 
design alterations. Rawlings and Rubio did not, however, have significant long-term data 
as the earliest program, Mexico’s Oportunidades, had only been implemented in 1998, 
while Brazil’s Bolsa Família had only been consolidated in 2002. They acknowledged 
this in recommending that further research needed to be conducted on how the CCTs 
would perform as permanent institutions and not as political programs subject to the 
whims of the party in power.  
Perhaps Norbert Schady and Ariel Fiszbein conducted the most expansive study. 
In their World Bank book, Schady and Fiszbein, laid out the economic and political 
conditions in which a country would undertake a CCT program. Additionally, they 
sought empirical evidence of the claim made by proponents of CCTs that they are “a way 
of reducing inequality, especially in the very unequal countries in Latin America; helping 
households break out of a vicious cycle whereby poverty is transmitted from one 
                                                 
10 Laura B. Rawlings and Gloria M. Rubio, Evaluating the Impact of Conditional Cash Transfer 
Programs: Lessons from Latin America, The World Bank - Policy Working Paper 3119 (August 2003) 5, 
http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2003/09/30/000094946_0309160409264
/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf.   
11 Ibid., 9.  
12 Ibid., 15.   
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generation to another.”13 It is a large comparative survey of nationwide (such as those of 
Jamaica and Brazil), niche (such as that of Chile), and pilot programs. They concluded 
that CCTs contributed to short-term reduction in poverty and improved use and access to 
health and education services” if the program was well designed.14 They also determined 
that, despite their general success, CCTs are not a panacea, and cannot on their own 
improve health and education outcomes and achieve significant poverty reduction. In that 
vein, they recommended further research be conducted in three areas: 1) impact of the 
CCT i.e., the importance of the size of the transfer, the recipients gender, the extent of 
monitoring, and penalization; 2) how the CCT interacts with other programs, specifically 




Impact studies on health, educational, and economic outcomes have tended to 
focus on individual countries. Since it has the largest CCT in the world, Brazil has been 
the subject of the most in-depth examinations. A 2007 World Bank study, The Nuts and 
Bolts of Brazil’s Bolsa Família Program: Implementing Conditional Cash Transfers in a 
Decentralized Context, is one such example. In the paper, Kathy Lindert and her 
colleagues chose target two audiences, interested international policy makers and 
Brazilian stakeholders, and tailored their questions thusly. For the international observers, 
who might be looking to Bolsa Família as a policy option, the authors sought to answer 
questions about 1) the program’s design parameters, 2) program implementation in a 
decentralized, federalist socio-political environment, 3) managerial improvements with 
regard to implementation, 4) naturally-arising innovations at the local level, 5) lessons to 
be learned, and 6) how to replicate the programs’ success in other nations. With respect 
to the domestic audience, the study sought answers to questions about 1) the process of 
consolidation of Bolsa Família’s predecessor programs into the CCT, 2) bureaucratic 
                                                 
13 Ariel Fiszbein and Norbert Schady, Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future 
Poverty, (Herndon, VA: World Bank Publications, 2009) 1, 
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=10369834. 
14 Ibid., 200.  
15 Ibid., 201. 
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efficiency and effectiveness, 3) program targeting, 4) oversight and fraud control, and 5) 
prospects for future design improvement.
16
 Their findings were extensive and generally 
positive. They were particularly impressed with the targeting and registration system, 
saying the high level of accuracy was “achieved through geographic mechanisms and 
means-testing under the unified family registry.”17 They felt that this would be of 
particular interest to international observers, as an effective targeting and registration 
system is pivotal to a successful CCT program.  
An interesting concept Lindert and her colleagues proposed for future study is 
what they called an “emerging graduation agenda.” They predicted that “the ‘new 
frontier’ for social policy in 2007 and beyond will increasingly focus on identifying 
feasible and effective levers to promote the ‘graduation’ agenda, so as to help poor 
families escape from poverty and reduce their reliance on transfer income for 
subsistence.”18 Their proposed agenda produced two arenas for future improvements, 
reforming the program and linking Bolsa Família to other social programs. In the reform 
arena, the authors ponder put forward two opposing ideas, 1) place time limits on the 
transfers while simultaneously reducing them and 2) providing additional incentives for 
improved human capital like additional grants for higher educational opportunities. With 
regard to linking Bolsa Família to complementary programs, the authors propose two 
ideas, 1) linking it to other social programs—something the Dilma Rousseff 
administration is doing now with the Brasil Sem Miséria  (Brazil without Poverty) 




Following in the same methodology of other CCT impact studies, Julieta Palma 
and Raúl Urzúa examine the design Chile’s Solidario, its components, and opportunities 
                                                 
16 Kathy Lindert, Anja Linder, Jason Hobbes, and Bénédicte de la Briére, The Nuts and Bolts of 
Brazil’s Bolsa Família Program: Implementing Conditional Cash Transfers in a Decentralized Context, 
Social Protection Discussion Paper - The World Bank, no. 0709 (May 2007) 8, 
http://josiah.berkeley.edu/2008Fall/ARE253/PN3%20Services%20for%20Poor/Brazil_BolsaFamilia.pdf.  
17 Ibid.,  117.  
18 Ibid., 119–20. 
19 Ibid., 120.  
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for using the program with other social initiatives.
20
 Solidario has been the subject of 
impact studies because of its fundamental differences from its larger Latin cousins, 
Oportunidades (Mexico) and Bolsa Família. Where those programs target all of the poor 
in their nations, Solidario targets only the extreme poor. Additionally, the program 
originated first as a way of integrating the extremely poor and indigent, who it was 
discovered were not receiving intended cash from the state, into the national social 
welfare system. Palma and Urzúa concluded that the program was successful in fulfilling 
the political goals of the Concertación party governments: “growth with equity, and 
democratic consolidation through social participation and active citizenship.”21 
Additionally, they found this effectiveness to be enhanced by the acknowledgement of 
poverty as a multi-dimensional problem not restricted to a low level of income remedied 
by cash payments, but one that requires psychosocial support.
22
 Despite this, the authors 
criticize how Solidario targets, finding that it lacks the community and association 
networks required to address problems beyond just the family unit, and suggest that the 
program be “broadened to look beyond intra-family relations to support associativity and 
participation in the community to help build a more active citizenship.”23 
The impact of Solidario on Chile’s children was the focus of a 2012 study by 
UNICEF analysts Bruno Martorano and Marco Sanfilippo. Using data from the 2001 and 
2006 national census, the authors compared program participants with a control group on 
non-participants in a series of categories to determine the CCT’s impact on multi-
dimensional poverty. Their research concluded that the program was effective in 
“extreme poverty reduction, improving labor market participation, and access to public 
resources” as well as positive results on increasing school attendance and visits to health 
                                                 
20 Julieta Palma and Raúl Urzúa, Anti-poverty Policies and Citizenry: The “Chile Solidario” 
Experience, Policy Paper no. 12 (Paris: UNESCO, 2005) 9, 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001402/140240e.pdf.  
21 Ibid., 29.  
22 Ibid., 31.  




 They noted that the program’s ability to effectively combat the multi-
dimensional poverty was the state’s ability to reach their target population, the extremely 




In a counter to generally positive evaluations of Solidario, Silvia Borzutzky 
analyzes the “nature and limited impact of Chile Solidario” and the ineffectiveness of the 
Chilean state’s market based poverty reduction schemes.26 She found that limited data 
was available on Solidario because the program was not systematically evaluated and 
managed from its inception. Additionally, she found that though families enrolled in 
Solidario were more likely to participate in job training than non-enrolled families, there 
were “no signs of improvements in the share of members who are actually employed or 
have stable employment.”27 Citing statistical data from Chile’s 2006 and 2009 national 
surveys CASEN and MID, Borzutzky found that the poverty rate actually increased by 
two percentage points between 2006 and 2009. While subsequent increases in poverty are 
associated with the financial crisis, the author also blames the small size of transfers, 
inadequate financial support for Solidario, poorly trained program workers, and limited 
employment opportunity for the overall ineffectiveness and low impact.
28
 
Impact case studies on Jamaica’s CCT are scarce compared to the other Western 
Hemispheric countries, despite being among the “first generation” of CCTs. It is a small 
country with little impact on the global economy. However, it is a Caribbean country 
with an extensive social welfare structure, of which PATH was the cornerstone of major 
reforms starting in 2001. Most research is found in large comparative studies that do not 
focus exclusively on the unique features of Jamaica. However, Dan Levy and Jim Ohls, 
                                                 
24 Bruno Martorano and Marco Sanfilippo, Innovative Features in Conditional Cash Transfers: An 
Impact Evaluation of Chile Solidario on Households and Children, Innocenti Working Papers no. 2012–03, 
(Florence, ITA: UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 2012) 13, http://www.unicef-
irc.org/publications/pdf/iwp_2012_03.pdf.  
25 Ibid., 14. 
26 Borzutzky, “Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin America and Anti-Poverty Policies in Chile,” 1.  
27 Ibid., 11.  
28 Ibid., 17. 
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working with primary sources from the government of Jamaica, attempted to fill the 
research void in an empirically-based 2010 report. In it, the authors used a regression 
discontinuity design to develop quantitative data on whether or not PATH was effectively 
targeting and reaching the intended assistance recipients and enhancing human capital by 
increased usage of healthcare and educational services. To acquire qualitative data on the 
program, Levy and Ohls used focus groups and interviews, which they assert, gave them 
a more complete and detailed analysis of PATH’s effectiveness and impact.29 They 
concluded that the program was effective at increasing school attendance. Though it was 
on average half a day per month per student, it was a three percent estimated increase 
over previous levels, which were already very high at 85 % attendance per month. This 
rate is the target rate of most CCTs worldwide. As a result, there was little room for 
significant improvement.
30
 From the focus groups and interviews, the authors determined 
that PATH was most effective in relieving some the financial burdens of sending children 
to school, specifically offsetting food and transportation costs. Where the study revealed 
small increases in school attendance, it revealed sizable improvement in healthcare usage, 
particularly for small children of 38 percent over prePATH trends.
31
 Despite the positive 
indicators, however, Levy and Ohls found no indication that the CCT improved long-
term health and education outcomes - improved school grades and advancement and 
health - citing possible predictive deficiencies in their own research design and the 
relatively short time life of the program as possible reasons. They also posit, as suggested 
by Borzutzky and Lindert et al., that while the CCT is a useful tool, it cannot on its own 




Of growing interest in CCT research is the effect of the programs on gender 
equality. In the large Latin American CCTs, women make up the vast majority of 
                                                 
29 Dan Levy and Jim Ohls, “Evaluation of Jamaica’s PATH Conditional Cash Transfer Programme,” 
Journal of Development Effectiveness 2, no. 4 (December 2010) 1, 
http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/4908084/Levy-EvaluationJamaica.pdf?sequence=1.  
30 Ibid., 29. 
31 Ibid., 30. 
32 Ibid., 30.  
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responsible recipients - those documented as head-of-household for cash disbursement 
and program registration purposes- accounting for 93 % in Brazil. Lindert asserts that this 
“preference for payments to women reflects international experience (and early tests in 
the municipal BE [Bolsa Escola] programs) that suggest that women are more likely to 
invest additional income in improving the education, health, and welfare of their family, 
particularly their children.”33 Despite this, Juliana Martínez-Franzoni and Koen Voorend 
argued in their 2012 study using empirical evidence that “patriarchal materialism is still 
at the core of Latin America’s new social policies.”34 Using six principles of gender 
equity adopted from Nancy Fraser social critical theorist, they developed a framework 
through which CCTs could be comparatively gauged: 1) Female access to cash and social 
services, 2) assumptions about women’s responsibility for unpaid domestic work, 3) 
encouraging women’s access to paid work, 4) reducing tension between paid and unpaid 
work based on gender, 5) reducing gender income disparities, and 6)equal treatment 
based on program design.
35
 They compared CCTs in three countries - Chile, Costa Rica, 
and El Salvador - and determined that the programs fared well in categories one and five, 
while doing poorly in the other categories. Martínez and Voorend found that there is 
room for CCTs to improve their performance beyond poverty and income differences. 
They propose additional incentives to encourage women to find paid work, thereby 
altering traditional perceptions of gender roles. Additionally, the authors “promoting day-
care services and male involvement in caretaking, programs could have positive effects 
upon the principles of anti-exploitation [category 2] and equality in time use [category 
3].”36 
                                                 
33 Lindert et al., Nuts and Bolts, 17. 
34 Juliana Martínez-Franzoni and Koen Voorend, “Blacks, Whites, or Grays?: Conditional Transfers 
and Gender Equality in Latin America,” Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State, and Society 
19, no. 3 (Fall 2012) abstract, 
http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.nps.edu/journals/social_politics/v019/19.3.franzoni.pdf.  
35 Ibid., 389.  
36 Ibid., 399–400. 
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E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis presents a comparative study of the CCTs in Brazil, Chile, and 
Jamaica to analyze the implementation and effectiveness of each program with regard to 
the social, political, and economic environment of each country. These countries have 
vastly different population demographics, economic characteristics, and socio-political 
problems. However, they each adopted, to a greater or lesser extent, the same social 
welfare policies to combat poverty and income inequality and to enhance human capital. 
By conducting a comparative analysis that examines the evolution of CCT program 
implementation in each country, with a particular emphasis on efforts to adapt programs 
to context, I hope to lay out plainly how these different country characteristics have 
contributed to the variable success of CCTs in achieving their goals. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized to compare the CCTs of the Brazil, Chile, and Jamaica 
across the following sections with respect to their individual social, political, and 
economic environments: 1) the conditional requirements and enforcement mechanisms, 
2) targeting and registration programs, and 3) the impact on short-term poverty, human 
capital accumulation, and income inequality. Though preliminary research indicates that 
CCTs are generally successful, they are usually evaluated as isolated entities outside of 
their social, political and economic environments. Finally, I look for potential areas of 
improvement and ideas on how to mitigate ineffectiveness with respect to each CCT’s fit 
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II. BRAZIL AND BOLSA FAMÍLIA 
A. POLITICS AND ECONOMY IN BRAZIL 
This chapter will focus on Brazil’s Bolsa Família program. The first section will 
frame the program within the unique political economic context of Brazil. As an 
extremely popular policy with the majority of Brazilians, Bolsa Família features 
prominently in politics, particularly elections. Similarly, popular support for the program 
has prompted the governments of Presidents Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff to create 
new wide-ranging social programs for housing and further poverty reduction. Because it 
is a direct government to citizen cash transfer to one quarter of the population, it has an 
important impact on the economy, particularly domestic consumption. The second 
section provides an analysis of the component parts of Bolsa Família, focusing the 
requirements for enrollment, enforcement of conditions, and how the program targets and 
registers potential enrollees. The final section will look at the degree to which the 
program is accomplishing its stated goals of reducing short-term poverty while breaking 
the cycle of generational poverty. To achieve this, I will discuss the impact Bolsa Família 
has had on educational, health, and poverty and inequality outcomes since its inception. 
Brazil transitioned to democracy in 1985 after two decades of authoritarian 
military rule. Since then, Brazilian national politics has moved progressively towards the 
left, culminating in the current 20 year dominance of the center left Brazilian Social 
Democratic Party (PSDB) under President Fernando Cardoso and the populist Workers’ 
Party (PT) under Lula and Rousseff. According to Alfred Montero, nearly 60% of all 
those who claim party affiliation support the PT. Moreover, the PT is the only party to 
have seen significant growth in membership since the transition.
37
 While Cardoso and 
PSDB introduced nationally the social programs that would eventually comprise Bolsa 
Familia, the PT has championed it and generally reaped the political benefits over the last 
14 years. However, strong political party affiliation is not a hallmark of Brazil’s 
                                                 
37 Alfred P. Montero, Brazil: Reversal of Fortune, (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2014), Ch.3 Sec. 4, 
Kindle Edition.  
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democracy. In their 2004 study, Yan de Souza Carreirão and Maria D’Alva Kinzo found 
that from 1989 and 2002, between 50% and 60% of the electorate said party affiliation 
was not a factor in their voting choices.
38
 The weak party system also means that 
candidates are not especially beholden to it for platform formulation or funding. 
Brazilians have traditionally voted for national level candidates based mostly on personal 
appeal and their potential to address issues important to individual communities and 
people in contrast to many modern western democracies, where party platforms and 
ideologies are prominent factors.
39
 Moreover, because voting is compulsory – 82% of the 
electorate voted in the 2010 general elections - those who benefit from Bolsa Família or 
have an interest in it are politically engaged.40 As a result, maintaining or even expanding 
Bolsa Família is a popular promise made by both liberal and conservative politicians. 
The government holds large stakes in many of Brazil’s largest, most important 
companies. Indeed, privatization for many of these corporations did not occur until the 
late 1990s starting with the Franco Administration, though the government maintains a 
significant presence in some of the country’s corporate “national champions.” As a result, 
the government controls 50.26% of the voting shares of Petrobras, one of the world’s 
largest oil and gas companies.
41
 Moreover, the government has “golden shares” in several 
companies. Using this mechanism, the state can exercise outsized influence on dealings 
of a private company. Significant financing by state-owned banks is another hallmark of 
Brazil’s mixed economy. Headlined by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), 
public financing surpassed private sources, accounting for 50.7% of the R$2.58 trillion 
(Brazilian reais) loan market in August 2013. Because of lending practices implemented 
by the Lula Administration during the 2008–9 global financial crises, cheap public credit 
                                                 
38 Yan de Souza Carrierão and Maria D’Alva Kinzo, “Partidos, Políticos, Preferência Partidária e 
Decisão Eleitoral no Brasil (1989/2002),” DADOS - Revista de Ciências Sociais, 47, no. 1 (2004): 155–56, 
http://www.scielo.br/pdf/dados/v47n1/a04v47n1.  
39  Montero, Brazil: Reversal of Fortune, Ch.3.  
40  David Fleischer, Countries at the Crossroads 2012 - Brazil, Freedom House (2012), 2–3, 
http://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Brazil%20-%20FINAL.pdf. 
41 “Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. - Petrobras(PBR),” NASDAQ, accessed on 1 September 2014, 
http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/pbr. 
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became easy for companies to get.
42
 This easy access to cash has also been transformed 
into social assistance reminiscent of Bolsa Família. One such program, called My Better 
Home, provides government loans to purchase furniture and household appliances to 
enrollees in the social housing program My Home My Life. My Better Home grants 
participants a R$ 5,000 limit credit card with a 5% interest rate. Like many of Brazil’s 
social schemes, a state-owned bank, Caixa Econômica Federal, underwrites My Better 
Home. My Home My Life is designed to provide low-interest mortgages with which low 
and middle class enrollees can rent-to-own government constructed homes. 
Another key aspect of the Brazilian economy is the shadow sector. According to 
the IMF, it looms large in South America, measuring at between 30 to 50% of GDP for 
all countries but Argentina and Chile.
43
 For Brazil, the shadow sector has measured an 
average of 39% of GDP for the first seven years of the century, though this number has 
been decreasing year to year to 36.6% in 2007.
44
 Like so much of the country’s economic 
activity, the government plays a prominent role. The money required to fund Brazil’s 
social programs and badly needed infrastructure upgrades has required fairly high taxes, 
particularly on consumer goods and businesses. Brazil sports a notoriously complex 
bureaucracy and multi-layered tax regime, with revenues from collection measuring 
38.9% of GDP.
45
 Because of such inefficiencies starting a business in Brazil takes an 
average of 107 days, three time the regional average. It also takes the average corporation 
about 2,600 hours a year to prepare and pay taxes, ranking the most time intensive in the 
                                                 
42 “Brazil: Warning over public-sector bank lending,” The Economist, 23 October 2013, accessed 4 
September 2014, http://www.eiu.com/industry/article/1351100719/brazil-warning-over-public-sector-bank-
lending/2013-10-23;  “A ripple begets a flood,” The Economist, 19 October 2013, accessed 4 September 
2014, http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21588133-politically-inspired-surge-
lending-weakening-state-owned-banks-latin. 
43 Anoop Singh, Sonali Jain-Chandra, and Adil Mohommad, Inclusive Growth, Institutions, and the 
Underground Economy, IMF Working Paper 12/47, (Washington: International Monetary Fund Publication 
Services, 2012), 6, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp1247.pdf.  
44 Friedrich Schneider, Andreas Buehn, and Claudio Montenegro, “New Estimates for the Shadow 
Economies all over the World,” International Economic Journal  24, no. 4, (2010), 454, 
http://web.b.ebscohost.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=e770fde5-1e6e-4911-8224-
87bbd8c4623b%40sessionmgr115&vid=1&hid=118.  
45 CIA World Factbook, Field Listing: Taxes and other revenues, accessed on 20 September 2014, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2221. 
 20 
world according to the World Bank.
46
 Additionally, the federal minimum wage in the 
country has steadily increased such that it sits at R$ 724 per month before taxes, which 
places those earners solidly in the middle class. However, the minimum wage is only 
available to workers in the formal economy. Thus, shadow workers and those who are 
self-employed report smaller formal incomes, which may place them below the poverty 
line and eligible for Bolsa Família. Finally, untaxable shadow workers are still eligible to 
participate in the nation’s government-sponsored pension system. As a result, many small 
employers - seeking relief from taxes and paperwork- and employees - looking to 
purchase cheaper goods and maintain their Bolsa Família benefits - have great incentive 
to participate in the shadow economy. 
B. BOLSA FAMÍLIA 
In 1974, Brazilian economist Edmar Bacha coined the term “Belindia,” a merging 
of Belgium and India to describe a fictional land where high Belgian-style and the low 
Indian-style standards of living existed in one nation as a not so subtle critique of the 
poverty and inequality he saw in his own country. Indeed, Brazil has the world’s 16th 
highest Gini coefficient at 51.9, though this has steadily fallen from an average of about 
60 from 1985 to 2000.
47
 This change in inequality has been attributed to several factors, 
among them easy access to credit, increased income due relatively high federal minimum 
wage, and low unemployment. Yet the Bolsa Família program has led to remarkable 
successes in addressing poverty and inequality in Brazil. In the 1990s, the country was 
afflicted by run-away inflation, high unemployment, high crime rates, and a growing 
inequality gap. In an effort to remedy these problems, which had an extremely negative 
impact on the Brazilian economy and society, President Cardoso instituted a series of 
social programs targeted at the poor. These programs, Bolsa Alimentação (Food Grant), 
Bolsa Escola (School Grant), and Auxílio Gás (Gas Allowance), were designed as 
                                                 
46 “Doing Business in Brazil - World Bank Group,” The World Bank, accessed September 30, 2014, 
doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/brazil#paying-taxes.  
47 CIA World Factbook, Country Comparison:: Distribution of Family Income - Gini Index, accessed 
on 9 August 2014, http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2172rank.html; 
Gini Index, The World Bank, accessed 9 August 2014, 
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individual CCTs. The federal programs grew out of individual municipal and state-level 
CCT programs designed to improve educational outcomes among impoverished children 
in the mid-1990s. They were, however, of varying effectiveness, as richer states and 
cities could provide greater benefits than their counterparts. Regardless, they were 
popular. Thus, by the time Cardoso decided to implement his four CCTs and integrate 
existing ones, nation-wide support already existed from public policy experts and 
economic elites to the average citizen on the right and left.
48
 Initial success of the 
programs led Cardoso’s successor, President Lula da Silva to combine the programs into 
what is now Bolsa Família 2003. 
C. CONDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND ENFORCEMENT  
The foundations of the program are the benefit disbursement rules and adherence 
to the requirement conditions set forth by the federal government. To address the first 
goal, immediate poverty eradication, the Brazilian government places eligibility into two 
separate income categories - poor and extremely poor. To qualify as poor, the household 
income from earned wages must be between R$77 and R$154. The base payment is an 
additional R$77. A poor-class family receives a payment of R$35 per child 15 years old 
and younger, limited to five children per family. For youths 16 and 17 years of age, the 
payment increases to R$42, but is limited to two. For pregnant and nursing mothers, an 
additional benefit of R$35 per month is available for the term of the pregnancy and for up 
to six months after birth. To qualify as extremely poor, the household income from 
earned wages must be less than R$77. As with the poor-class, the extremely poor also 
receive R$35 per child 15 years old and younger with a payment limit at five children. If 
a family receiving Bolsa Família benefits still remains extremely poor, then payments are 
recalculated to ensure they are lifted above the extreme poverty line.
49
 Therefore, when 
combined with earned income, a family receiving Bolsa Família has the opportunity to 
                                                 
48 Tatiana Feitosa de Britto, “The Emergence and Popularity of Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin 
America,” in Social Protection for the Poor and Poorest: Concepts, Policies, and Politics, eds. Armando 
Barrientos and David Hulme, (London: Palgrave McMillan, 2010), 186. 
49 Bolsa Família Benefits, Brazilian Ministry of Social Development and Hunger Alleviation, 
accessed 27 September 2014, http://www.mds.gov.br/bolsafamilia/beneficios.  
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earn R$455 per month, regardless of poverty level. To put the maximum possible amount 
of Bolsa money in perspective, the average monthly income in Brazil was R$934 in 2013, 
while the minimum wage is R$724 per month.  
Once deemed financially eligible for benefits, the legally responsible recipient 
must adhere to healthcare and education conditions. These requirements are meant to 
address the second main goal of Bolsa Família, breaking the poverty cycle to long-term 
enhance human capital. For all children 7 years old and younger, parents must ensure 
maintenance of up-to-date vaccination schedules. The children must also attend regular 
check-ups that chart, amongst other things, their growth. Pregnant or lactating mothers 
must attend regular pre and postnatal examines and participate in health education and 
nutrition classes.
50
 The emphasis on youth health and proper infant care for mothers 
highlights the high number of teenage mothers in Brazil. According to the United 
Nations, in 2011 approximately 45% of the nation’s 2,824,776 newborns had mothers 24 
years old or younger. Of total newborns, 18% came from mothers 19 and younger - 
520,224. In the same report, the United States had 4,247,694 newborns in 2008 of which 
35% had mothers 24 years old and younger. Of the total number, 10% were 19 and 
younger - 440,522.
51
 There are also education conditions that must be adhered to. All 
children from six to 15 years old must be enrolled in school and attend a minimum of 
85% of school days a month. Youths 16 to 17 years old must attend 75% of school days a 
month. If a child misses school for any reason, the parent must notify both the local Bolsa 
Família office and school.
52
 The penal system for non-compliance is tiered and designed 
to identify underlying compliance problems and resolving them. First time offenders are 
warned, but receive no financial penalty. Those families who offend for a second time are 
blocked for 30 days, but receive the aggregate benefits after the block is lifted. Those 
who offend for a third and fourth time receive 60-day suspensions without the 
                                                 
50 Lindert et.al., The Nuts and Bolts 18. 
51 United Nations Statistics Department, Demographics Yearbook 2012, last accessed 27 September 
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D. REGISTRATION AND TARGETING 
Managing such a large national social program is a massive bureaucratic 
undertaking. Prior to their consolidation under Bolsa Família, each of Brazil’s major 
programs had their own independent databases. Information in these databases were often 
duplicated since a family enrolled in one program was probably enrolled in the others as 
well. With the creation of Bolsa Família, the Brazilian government also created the 
Cadastro Único (Single Registry) system to combine all the other databases. The system 
helps reduce administrative costs, benefit fraud, and information duplication.
54
 Despite 
some early implementation, user interface, and coordination challenges - the lack of real-
time data access for the Ministry of Social Development and Hunger Alleviation and 
municipalities and no clear operating rules - the registry system has become more 
streamlined. A key part of Cadastro Único is the effective combination of decentralized 
day-to-day data collection duties with centralized data consolidation, eligibility 
determination, and funds disbursement. Since data collection is the domain of the 
municipalities, there is great variation in how it is done, meaning some databases are 
maintained with more care than others. The local government is responsible for training 
registry personnel based on federal guidelines, but quality of training varies, making the 
system vulnerable to incidents of corruption in which officials direct payments to 
individuals who would not otherwise qualify. However, because it is decentralized and 
administered by local governments, data collection and registration is tailored to the 
specific geographic and demographic challenges of a municipality. This is particularly 
important given that the poorest areas of Brazil, the northern and Amazonian states, have 
of the most physically and technologically isolated populations.
55
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All families are eligible to register in the Cadastro. Selection for Bolsa Família, 
however, differs across the country. Each municipality is given a maximum allowance 
quota based on poverty estimates by the Ministry of Social Development. If a 
municipality’s actual number of qualified families is greater than its quota, then priority 
is given to the poorest families and those with the greatest number of children under 17 
years old. Each municipality must undergo an information recertification every two 
years. This has drastically improved the quality and coverage of Bolsa Família. For 
example, the 2005–2006 recertification resulted in an increase of registry verifications 
from 31% in March 2005 to 78% in June 2006. Along with significant updates to 
registrant data like changes in individual income level (34% of families) and changes to 
legally responsible recipient, the recertification added 2.7 million new families while 
canceling benefits to 1.4 million families, mostly due to migration out of poverty 
(52%).
56
 Additionally, because data collection and registration is so articulated, the 
Cadastro Único can be used by the other government organizations looking to improve 
coverage or target specific neighborhoods for additional services. The database is being 
used as the basis for Pres. Dilma Rousseff’s Bolsa expansions “Brasil sem Miséria” 
(Brazil without Poverty) will use the Cadastro Único as its main tool for targeting 
impoverished children. Targeting will take place under the auspices of the Busca Ativa 
(Active Search) plan, which is intended to “take the state to the citizen, without waiting 
for the poorest people to reach the government.”57 
Coverage, however, remains a problem. While Bolsa Família incorporates 
approximately 50 million people, about 1/4 of the mostly urban total population, it is 
reaching far fewer people in the southern megacities relative to the rural north and 
Amazon. In the rural areas, 41% of the population is covered compared to 17% of urban 
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dwellers. The Economist has identified three main reasons for this.
58
 First, the 
consolidation of the individual social programs into a single, all-encompassing entity 
resulted in lower assistance incomes for many families, especially those who could get 
extra money for having more than the five child limit. Combined with higher cost of 
living in urban areas, the assistance just does not go as far as it does in rural settings. 
Second, child labor is still higher in the cities since working children can often bring in 
more money than Bolsa Família provides. As a result, the school attendance condition is 
less a threat to urban Brazilians than it is in the countryside, where child labor often 
involves seasonal farm work. Indeed, The Economist found that half of the families that 
lost their benefit in São Paulo, 13,000 households, was due to child truancy. Third, the 
relatively expensive housing in the favelas means that multi-family households, where a 
young mother or father may choose to raise their child in the same home as their 
extended family. Because Bolsa Família is only dispersed by household and not by 
individual family, the program will necessarily underperform in the densely populated 
favelas. Nevertheless, approximately 93% of legally responsible recipients are women. 
This preference is a part of the law that authorized Bolsa Família because women are 
more likely to spend Bolsa money on family necessities and education than men, and 





Bolsa Família’s impact on education outcomes are mixed. Research shows that 
generally, Bolsa beneficiary children attend school at a higher rate than those not enrolled 
in the program. Despite these improvements, research also shows that Bolsa Família has 
little to no impact on timely matriculation to higher grades and lowering dropout rates.  
A 2010 study comparing CCT programs in Mexico, Ecuador, Brazil, and Chile 
found that the probability of school absence in the months preceding the survey was 3.6% 
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lower for Bolsa children than it was for non-Bolsa children. The same study found that 
the probability of a Bolsa child dropping out of school was 1.6% lower than that of a non-
Bolsa child. There were similar positive results in the other surveyed countries.
60
 A 2011 
study analyzing Bolsa Família’s impact on enrollment, dropout rates, and grade 
promotion also had positive, if minuscule, results. Glewwe and Kassouf found that Bolsa 
students, who constitute about one-third of Brazil’s student population, had a 2.8% higher 
enrollment rate for 1–4 grade students and 3.2% for 5–8 grade students. Dropout rates for 
both groups of Bolsa students were also lower, .53% and .28% respectively, than their 
non-Bolsa colleagues.
61
 They also found a correlation between Bolsa Família’s most 
rapid period of expansion, 2000 to 2002 and higher enrollment and lower dropout rates. 
Bolsa Família plays a major role in increasing enrollment for non-White students at a rate 
higher than the national program average. For Black, Mulatto, and Indigenous 1–4 grade 
children, enrollment rates are 13%, 4%, and 15% respectively compared to their non-
Bolsa fellows.
62
 In another study UNESCO found that 95% of eligible children were 
enrolled in primary school in 2010 and 81% of eligible children were enrolled in 
secondary school.
63
  However, the same study found that just 55% of children completed 
secondary school and nearly a quarter of first grade children had to repeat the grade. Like 
dropout rates, the program’s impact on grade promotion rates compared to non-Bolsa 
students is very small .9% for 1–4 grade children and .3% for 5–8 grade children.  
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Bolsa Família’s impact on education outcomes can be seen as a problem of supply 
and demand. The program clearly provides the demand in the form of getting children 
into schools. Again, this is especially apparent among Blacks and Indians, who have 
higher poverty rates than the other segments of society. Thus, while as a whole 
attendance rates increased just incrementally, they are significantly higher among the 
poorest. The supply of education, expressed in matriculation and dropout rates, is another 
matter. For some 3.4 million children 17 years and younger, the program’s incentives are 
simply not enticing enough to prevent them from venturing into workforce.
64
 Poorer 
students enter school less prepared than their wealthier colleagues. As a result, they do 
not perform as well on grade-appropriate coursework and do not advance on time. 
Moreover, Bolsa Família contributes nothing to improving the quality of instructors, 
curriculum, or facilities – supply side factors - pivotal to a student’s success.  
Data on the long-term impact of Bolsa Família is mostly based on extrapolation 
and conjecture as the program is simply not old enough to adequately address such 
questions as whether it helps children get into and graduate from university. However, 
the fact that poor students, particularly those in the more economically depressed 
northern and Amazonian states, are attending school at higher rates than would otherwise 
be the case is encouraging.  
2. Health 
Like indications for education, the long-term impact of Bolsa Família on the 
health of the recipient population is difficult to ascertain because the program has not 
been in existence long enough. However, some short-term results are available, 
particularly among very young children. A study by the World Health Organization 
published in 2011 found the program was not only well targeted, but that young children 
were clearly benefiting. The ages of children surveyed were from 0 to 5 years. Using 
child birth weight, education level of the family head, access to water and electricity, and 
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child age-height-weight ratios as variables, the study found that Bolsa children were 26% 
more likely to have the age appropriate height and weight than non-Bolsa children.
65
 This 
clearly shows the immediate impact of Bolsa Família on early childhood health outcomes 
that are critical to development later in life. The numbers also indicate the premium 
guardians place on the health of their children, and given the opportunity and resources, 
guardians will avail themselves of the health system. Not surprisingly, the parents of 
Bolsa children tend to have less schooling than their non-Bolsa counterparts, with the 
greatest differences being between those with at least 9 years of school - 26.9% for non-
Bolsa and 11.3% for Bolsa.
66
 Similarly, recipient families also tend to have less access to 
electricity and piped water in their homes than non-recipients. The fact that Bolsa 
children appear to be meeting critical early development goals despite clear economic 
and social deficiencies implies that recipient families are spending more money on 
nutritious foods and other childcare products. A 2010 study found that Bolsa Família not 
only increased the odds of a child going to regular clinic visits and receiving regular 
vaccinations, but it also contributed to unexpected positive spillover for older children. 
The program has no health conditionalities for children 7–17 years old, but those children 
are far more likely to continue receiving regular check-ups and vaccinations.
67
 This trend 
in particular is important to the long-term goal of breaking generational poverty. Because 
these older children are using health services beyond the requirements of the 
conditionality without any added monetary incentive, it is conceivable that they will 
continue do so into adulthood and with their own children. 
The other major health conditionality for Bolsa Família, routine prenatal checkups 
for expecting mothers, does not show any appreciable difference between Bolsa and non-
Bolsa mothers. In 2005, Bolsa recipients averaged 3.5 prenatal visits per pregnancy. By 
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2009, that number increased to 4.4 visits. During that same time period, non-recipients 
saw an even more dramatic increase, going from 2.9 to 4.3 visits. Likewise, in 2005, 
20.9% of all pregnant women received no prenatal care regardless of program 
membership, more specifically 17.7% for Bolsa and 22.3% for non-Bolsa. By 2009, the 




3. Poverty and Inequality 
Perhaps Bolsa Família’s greatest and most contested impact is on poverty and 
inequality in Brazil over the last 14 years. When Bolsa Família came online in 2003, 
Brazil’s poverty rate stood at about 25% or 45 million people. By 2012, that rate has been 
cut to 9% or 18 million people by national standards.
69
 The Gini coefficient also fell from 
about 60 to 51 during the same time period. The impact of Bolsa Família on poverty and 
inequality should not be overstated—it is certainly not the only mechanism used by the 
government to lower poverty and income inequality. The country has a very generous 
pension system open to all whether or not they are employed in the formal or shadow 
economy and a high minimum wage. Additionally, rapid economic growth over the past 
decade has played a major role in poverty reduction. There is, however, major dispute on 
the role the program plays in reducing poverty and inequality. Diego Sánchez-Ancochea 
and Lauro Mattei estimated in their 2011 study that Bolsa Família accounted for 10% of 
the drop in inequality.
70
 Meanwhile, Sergei Soares cites several studies that attribute 
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anywhere from 31% to 12% of Brazil’s drop in income inequality to the program.71  
Regardless, the drop in inequality attributed to the Bolsa Família is substantial. As shown 
earlier, the program has the ability to more than double a family’s income. However, the 
maximum benefit R$ 455, still does not match minimum wage. As a result, though Bolsa 
Família does not significantly reduce the number of poor people, it closes the poverty gap 
by 18% and greatly reduces the severity of poverty by 25%.
72
 This means that the 
numbers of extremely poor families now constitute the smallest income class in Brazil.  
Several factors appear to contribute to the program’s inability to lower the number 
of poor people. First, the number of enrollees in Bolsa Família has nearly doubled. In 
2003, there were 27 million beneficiaries, and now there are 50 million. This is due to 
deliberate government enrollment expansion and better targeting as the system matured. 
Second, the speed with which Brazil’s minimum wage, and consequently the poverty 
line, has risen necessitated an increase in Bolsa’s benefit. In 2003, the minimum benefit 
was R$50, rising to its current level of R$77. Thus, while the value of the real (Brazil 
currency) increased relative to the price of goods over the past decade – increasing 
buying power - and more people benefited from increased incomes in the lower economic 
classes, they, nevertheless, remained in poverty. Finally, unlike their Chilean 
counterparts, Bolsa beneficiaries can remain enrolled in the program in perpetuity. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Bolsa Família has come to play an important part in Brazil’s political economy. 
Due to its popularity and importance to the country’s vast lower middle and poor classes, 
as well as the fact of compulsory voting in Brazil, political support for the program is high 
regardless of political ideology. Buoyed by Bolsa’s wide support, Rousseff and her left-
wing Workers’ Party have created more wide-ranging social programs and policies like My 
Better Home and a steadily increasing minimum wage. In addressing its goals of 
                                                 
71 Sergei Soares, Bolsa Família, Its Design, Its Impacts and Possibilities for the Future, Institute for 
Applied Economic Research, Working Paper 89, (Brasilia, DF: International Policy Centre for Inclusive 
Growth, 2012), 20, www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper89.pdf.  
72 Ibid., 20–2. 
 31 
combatting short-term poverty while breaking the cycle of generational poverty, Bolsa 
Família has shown success and promising trends with regard to health outcomes and 
limited gains where education is concerned, especially long-term. Young children are 
showing significant gains in early childhood height and weight, while older children are 
continuing to use clinical services beyond Bolsa’s requirements. However, there were no 
noticeable differences in prenatal care for pregnant Bolsa mothers compared to their non-
Bolsa mothers. School attendance rates were generally higher for Bolsa children. However, 
there was no noticeable improvement in dropout rates and grade advancement, which does 
not bode well for long term outcomes. Finally, Bolsa Família has proven effective at 
significantly reducing income inequality as evidenced by Brazil’s improved Gini 
coefficient and the drastic reduction in the number of extremely poor citizens. However, 
the overall number of poor in Brazil has not fallen in kind with that of the extremely poor. 
  
 32 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 33 
III. CHILE AND SOLIDARIO 
A. POLITICS AND ECONOMY IN CHILE 
This chapter addresses Chile’s CCT program, Solidario. The first section will 
place the program within the free-market, liberal democracy political economy that 
characterizes Chile. Compared to many other CCT programs around the world, Solidario 
is small and directed only at the extremely poor who did not benefit from the country’s 
economic boom and subsequent drastic reduction in poverty in the 1990s. Moreover, 
Solidario takes a novel approach to poverty eradication by tailoring support to the 
specific needs of individual recipient families, thus keeping with the spirit of personal 
responsibility for one’s economic well-being. The second section provides an analysis of 
the component parts of Solidario, focusing on the requirements for enrollment, 
enforcement of conditions, and how the program targets and registers potential enrollees. 
The final section will look at the degree to which the program is accomplishing its stated 
goals of eliminating extreme poverty and addressing the multi-dimensional elements of 
poverty. To achieve this, I will discuss the impact Solidario has had on educational, 
health, and poverty and inequality outcomes since its inception.   
During the regime of General Augusto Pinochet, Chile underwent major 
economic change. Spearheaded by a group University of Chicago-trained Chilean 
economists known colloquially as the “Chicago Boys, the country introduced a series of 
free market reforms based on the Washington Consensus that produced unprecedented 
growth. Chile stood out as one of few states in Latin America to enjoy sustained and 
stable economic growth. However, that growth came at the cost of government services, 
ranging from pensions to public health, and increased inequality as the Pinochet regime 
drastically reduced taxes and government expenditures. Thus, following the return to 
civilian rule in 1990, the government, under the center-left Concertación coalition of 
parties, instituted policies designed to lower poverty and improve social services while 
maintaining high growth rates. By 2000, the number of Chileans living below the poverty 
line dropped from 40% of the population to 20%. However, high income inequality 
remained stubbornly unaffected by the economic success while extreme poverty, though 
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greatly reduced between 1990 and 1996, refused to disappear in the latter half of the 
decade, dropping from 5.7% to 5.6%.73 To address these problems, the government 
created Chile Solidario in 2002. 
B. SOLIDARIO 
Unlike its counterparts throughout Latin America like Bolsa Família and 
Mexico’s Oportunidades, Solidario is a ‘niche’ CCT, meaning it is designed for a small 
part of the population, namely the indigent. Its relatively small size means that the 
program can take a more novel approach to addressing poverty in Chile. In 2000, the 
government conducted an investigation to determine why the percentage of the 
population who were extremely poor did not drop along with the portion that was simply 
poor. They discovered that along with the expected indicators of lower incomes and 
education levels, the indigent were surprisingly not accessing social development 
programs meant specifically for them. The government discovered that not only was 
there a lack of knowledge about these programs, but the programs themselves were not 
properly targeting the extremely poor.74 After a series of conferences involving poverty 
experts and national and local government officials, it was decided that any anti-program 
targeted at the indigent should not only provide cash transfer like other CCTs, but also a 
concerted effort to marry up individual families with specific social services. Families 
would also be paired with a permanent social worker that would handle their cases for as 
long as they remained enrolled Solidario. The program did not face major opposition in 
the Chilean parliament, as it is a Concertación initiative in a center-left dominated 
government. Additionally, only a small portion of the population would be targeted, 
enrolling just 5% of the population.75 
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C. CONDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND ENFORCEMENT 
As stated before, Solidario seeks to address the multidimensional factors that 
cause poverty. The architects of the program determined that these factors can be 
addressed by meeting 53 minimum conditions grouped in seven general categories: 
Personal Identification, Health, Education, Family Dynamics, Housing, and Employment 
and income (See Table A for description of each condition). Enrolled families are offered 
preferred access to social programs designed to address each category. As a result, 
Solidario consists of four parts. First, a family enrolled in the program is assigned a social 
worker who helps develop action plans based on the seven categories which the family is 
contractually obligated to complete. The social workers provide psychosocial support 
through 21 visits to the home where they check the family’s progress in meeting its 
contract obligations and provide information on available social programs and support 
through community networks like drug rehabilitation and job training. This initial phase 
of Solidario is the first 24 months of enrollment and the most intense period of 
government interaction with the family. It provides the clearest expression of Solidario’s 
goal, “the government takes responsibility for supplying services and resources and 
families commit to overcome problematic aspects of their lives, using the opportunities 
offered by the government.”76  
The second component of Solidario is the direct cash transfer. Where transfer 
amounts can double earned income and remain unchanged over time in Bolsa Família, 
Solidario transfers are significantly smaller and regressive over time. They are also time 
limited. The first payment is called the protection bonus, and lasts two years in a phase 
called the Bridge Program. An enrolled family will receive P$15,800 (pesos) per month 
for the first six months in the program. Thereafter, the amount is steadily decreased to 
P$7,600 over the rest of the first two years. To put this in perspective, according to the 
Ministry of Social Development, Chile’s indigence line sits at P$36,049 for urban areas 
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and P$27,778 for rural areas per month.77  These comparatively small transfers, which 
average just 6% of income for recipients, are designed to help the family offset the costs 
of accessing the government provided services and programs, rather than increasing 
consumption of household goods like in Bolsa Família. Moreover, it is regressive because 
the initial costs of accessing and learning about government programs are higher than 
sustained use of said programs. These families are also expected to be increasing their 
income or at least be in a better position to do so the longer they are in the program. 
Solidario is time limited to encourage families to meet their conditional contracts, on 
which continued payments are based. Failure to do so results in light punishment 
compared to some other CCTs. Non-compliance results in a warning and then delay 
and/or slight reductions in payment for subsequent contract violations. A family is never 
suspended or withdrawn for contract violations.78  
The third component of Solidario is properly directed cash subsidies that eligible 
Chileans have a right to. As stated before, the designers of Solidario discovered that a 
large number of the indigent were unaware that they eligible and had a right, by virtue of 
citizenship, to subsidy money and services. The guaranteed subsidies most affected by 
the program are the SUF (family allowance), PASIS (old age pension), and SAP (water 
subsidy). The SUF amounts to P$ 9,200 and can double if there are disabled family 
members in the household. Additionally, the family is eligible for free dental services 
through SUF. The PASIS is a pension system that applies to economically vulnerable 
Chileans over 65 years old and amounts to P$85,000. The SAP (water subsidy) provides 
a family with cash, according to their needs, to obtain clean. Since they are rights, the 
guaranteed subsidies are not subject to penalty for lack of contract compliance. 
The final component of Solidario gives priority access to social services and 
programs to enrolled families, thus fulfilling the government’s obligation to its indigent 
constituency. It is, however, the responsibility of enrolled families to avail themselves of 
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these programs in an effort to move out of extreme poverty. Though families are only 
allowed to remain enrolled in Solidario for five years, they can still remain in any 
community networks and assistance programs they became part of during their time in 
the CCT. Only social worker visits, preferred program access, and the conditional cash 
payment to offset transaction costs are ended after the five years.  
The conditional requirements, program benefits, and light enforcement 
mechanisms reflects the spirit with which Solidario was designed and instituted as well as 
the market-focused, capitalist attitude which has historically driven Chilean economics. 
The cash transfers are deliberately small so that a family cannot survive on them alone as 
they might in CCT programs with more significant payouts and population reach. The 
employment of social workers to help guide families to state assets they may use to pull 
themselves out of extreme poverty and to ensure they are fulfilling their contract 
obligations demonstrates how serious the Chilean government is in its desire to eradicate 
extreme poverty. 
D. REGISTRATION AND TARGETING 
As a narrowly focused program, Solidario can be far more detailed in how it 
targets and registers potential enrollees than other CCTs. Initially, the program used 
proxy means testing based on a questionnaire that produced a numerical score, called 
CAS, which would help prioritize a family’s service needs. The CAS score, however, 
could not clearly distinguish indigent from poor, but non-indigent, families. To correct 
this, the federal government chose to use the biennial national household survey, called 
CASEN, to not only determine indigence nationwide, but to do so on a region-by-region 
basis, as what may qualify for extreme poverty in one region might be different for 
another region.79  This allowed the government to assign more accurate regional quotas, 
increasing the number of available slots. Thus, while the planned number of slots for the 
program was about 225,000 households spread out between 2002 and 2005, more 
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articulated targeting increased that number to about 298,000 households, an increase of 
25%.80 An added benefit of using regional CAS scores combined with the CASEN 
survey rather than setting a national standard is that there is very little leak through. In 
their study on the administration of Solidario, de la Guardia et al., found that on average, 
just 2% of enrollees had CAS scores above the regional cutoff for program admission.81 
Those families who have the lowest CAS scores, which corresponds to those most in 
need, are prioritized in the quota system. Thus, adequate coverage does not appear to be a 
problem. As shown in the 2014 update to their 2010 study, Carniero et al. found that of 
the approximately 50,000 eligible families a year were invited to join Solidario, about 5% 
chose not to accept or could not be located.82 Another 5% had their enrollment process 
interrupted by choice of the family, program, or both. The remaining 90% were processed 
into Solidario. As with many other CCTs, women are the preferred responsible recipients 
of the cash transfers in Chile.  
E. IMPACT 
1. Education 
Solidario’s impact on educational outcomes has been fairly good despite the high 
quality of the Chilean education system and the small target population, which leaves the 
program with relatively little room to provide significant improvements. However, 
indigent students benefit from increased access to programs like pre-school, adult 
education, and School Feeding, which provides free food to indigent school children. 
Chile achieved near perfect coverage for primary school enrollment by 1980, and 
doubled the Latin American average for years of schooling at 10.14 for people 15 years 
and older in 2000. The Latin American regional average was 5.8 years of schooling for 
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people 25 years and old.83 Moreover, enrollment of secondary school aged children was 
at 90% of in 2000 and has steadily increased since at least 1987 to the present.84 
However, Galasso found in her impact evaluation of the program that two-thirds of adults 
in targeted families had not completed primary school.85 The same study also shows that 
the program is having a significant impact on school attendance at all levels. According 
to Galasso, preschool enrollment for Solidario children was 5% higher relative to non-
Solidario children and 8% for those 6 to 15 years of age.86 There is also clear evidence of 
families taking advantage of extra programs to improve their overall educational level. 
Unlike Bolsa Família offers adults no cash incentive to complete secondary school nor 
provides access adult literacy programs, Solidario does. Since they are better informed 
about these educational opportunities by social workers, and are encouraged to attend 
through social networks formed in part by Solidario, adults are taking advantage, 
becoming more literate. At the time of her report, Galasso found that as a result of 
Solidario, adult literacy increased 5–8% in urban areas and 7–10% in rural areas among 
enrolled families.87  
Clearly, Solidario has a significant impact on improving educational outcomes. 
Not only are attendance rates among the indigent better, but also the more holistic 
approach which provides preferred access to adult literacy programs and free school 
meals for children shows that the careful, articulated targeting combined with 
psychosocial support from community networks and social workers are critical to 
enhancing the education, and thus, the human capital of Chile. 
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2. Health 
Perhaps the area of least impact by Solidario lies in health outcomes. Like its 
education system, Chile boasts a robust healthcare system and has one of the highest life 
expectancies and lowest infant mortality rates in the Western Hemisphere. These facts 
leave Solidario very little room in which to make any significant impact even on the 
health outcomes of the indigent. 
In the 2011 update to her 2006 study, Galasso observed very few differences in 
the health status and government program usage between Solidario and non-Solidario 
people. The only significant and consistent outcome was that Solidario families were 
more likely to be enrolled in the country’s public health system, about 3% higher for both 
urban and rural members.88 Galasso’s analysis corroborated by the findings of Palma and 
Urzúa that compliance with the health conditions, 96.9%, was the highest among the 
seven categories of Solidario. The high compliance rate implies that not only are the 
health conditions the easiest to meet, but that the Chilean health system is easily 
accessible to the indigent regardless of if they are enrolled or not, and that they were 
making use health programs even before the institution of Solidario.  
Long-term implications of these minor health outcomes are that Chile will 
continue to be one of the historically healthiest countries in the Western Hemisphere, 
from its wealthiest citizens down to the poorest regardless of Solidario. 
3. Poverty and Inequality 
Solidario has been instrumental in decreasing the extreme poverty rate in Chile. 
As stated before, the program ensures access to cash subsidies that some Chileans are 
entitled to by law. These subsidies, unlike the conditional transfers remain unchanged as 
long as the family is eligible. Combined with the job training and placement initiatives 
the program champions, Solidario is important in actively increasing employment 
opportunities and reducing poverty among enrolled families.  
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From 2000 to 2011, extreme poverty fell from 5.6% of the population to 2.8.89 
Unlike Brazil, Chile has not drastically increased its minimum wage or bestowed 
generous public pensions on its population. Carneiro et al., found that Solidario had a 
particularly high impact on those families who had not previously been partaking in the 
SUF, an increase of 18 and 22% two and four years respectively after they had enrolled.90  
The same study showed that there was no significant increase in accessing either the old 
age and disability subsidies or the water subsidies. Research is unclear on why this is the 
case. However, it appears that the greater impact lies in the job training and placement 
programs. Galasso found that participation in these programs increased, 30% in urban 
areas and 14% in rural areas.91  Subsequent employment among Solidario families 
increased by 6% in urban areas and 4% in rural areas. Both figures are significant 
because they demonstrate that participants are actively working within the program to 
pull themselves from indigence.  
Despite the progress, there are still a number of people in extreme poverty 12 
years into the program. Likewise the Gini coefficient remains among the highest in the 
hemisphere, though it has dropped from .58 to .54. There is no evidence that Solidario 
has had any appreciable effect on inequality in Chile, in contrast to Bolsa Família. With 
Bolsa, the drop in inequality was achieved primarily because of the size and duration of 
the transfers. Because cash received from the Solidario is comparatively small, even the 
guaranteed subsidies, and time limited, there is no way to create the kind of sustained 
household capital needed to develop the kind of consumerism that has helped fuel the 
Brazil’s economic explosion and create its middle class. Thus, long-term Solidario 
assisted inequality reduction does not look to be promising. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Solidario has played a limited role in Chile’s overall political economy, but 
appears to be achieving its goal of eradicating extreme poverty from the country. As a 
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niche program focused on a very small percentage of the population, it has not been of 
major political importance, though it is in line with the policies of the center-left 
governments that have dominated the country since its transition to democracy in 1990. 
In addressing short-term poverty by providing enrollees the opportunity to take advantage 
of a myriad of government programs, Solidario attacks the multi-dimensional factors of 
poverty while keeping with the national spirit of self-reliance and individual 
responsibility through conditional contracts arranged by social workers. Such programs 
have contributed greatly to improving educational prospects for both children and adults, 
thus improving their marketability and prospects when they enter the labor force. 
Solidario, however, has not significantly influenced health outcomes, though compliance 
with the program’s health conditionalities is the highest among the seven poverty factors. 
Again, this is not necessarily a bad thing as it indicates that the Chilean health system 
was effective in reaching the indigent before the institution of Solidario. Finally, job 
training and placement programs combined with the proper distribution of guaranteed 
subsidies, particularly the SUF, appear to be a primary factor in the reduction of Chile’s 
extreme poverty rate over the past 12 years. The programs, with preferred access 
provided by Solidario, have helped half the rate and increase employment for the indigent 
adults. Despite these advancements, income inequality in Chile remains high. 
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IV. JAMAICA AND THE PROGRAMME FOR ADVANCEMENT 
THROUGH HEALTH (PATH) 
A. POLITICS AND ECONOMY IN JAMAICA 
This chapter will focus on Jamaica’s Program of Advancement Through Health 
and Education. The first section will frame the program within the unique political 
economic context of Jamaica. Unlike Brazil and Chile, Jamaica has had nearly stagnant 
economic growth since 1990 and has endured negative growth at least five times in the 
past 23 years. Paradoxically, the percentage of the population living in poverty has fallen 
from a 1991 high of 45% to the current level of 16%. The second section will address the 
component parts of PATH, paying particular attention to enrollment requirements, 
condition enforcement, and how the program targets and registers potential enrollees. The 
final section will examine how well the program is accomplishing its stated goal of 
improving educational and health outcomes in the short-term in hopes of improving the 
long-term economic prospects of Jamaica. To achieve this, I will discuss the impact 
PATH has had on educational, health, and poverty and inequality since its inception. 
Since it achieved independence from Great Britain in 1962, Jamaica has seen its 
economic prospects decline. Like Brazil, it is endowed with considerable natural 
resources in the form of vast tracts of rich arable land and minerals, tourist attractions, a 
young population, and an exploitable international brand. However, Jamaica has been 
unable to turn these assets into sustained economic success. In an effort to mimic the 
social success of many of its Caribbean neighbors, successive governments undertook a 
number of programs to improve the standard of living, requiring a multitude of loans 
from the IMF and deficit spending. Another salient aspect of the Jamaican political 
economy reminiscent of Brazil is the presence of the shadow economy. Between 1999 
and 2007, it accounted for an average of 34.5% of GDP, with a high of 36.4% and a low 
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of 32.9% during that period.92 This represents a substantial amount of potential tax 
revenue. The government also began subsidizing the island’s farm products, which 
proved to be more expensive internationally while constituting a small share of the 
market. These factors, exacerbated by global economic shocks in the 70s, 80s, 90s, and 
2000s, persistently high unemployment, and rampant corruption, have resulted in nearly 
static GDP growth since the early 1970s and large-scale migration of much of the 
population to North America and Europe. Indeed, remittances from expatriate Jamaicans 
accounted for an average of 14.6% of GDP since 2000.93 Additionally, repeated loans 
from the IMF and the inability to service them and meet economic and social 
development goals has made Jamaica one of the most indebted countries in the world, 
with public debt standing at 150% of GDP. To help solve its deficit spending conundrum 
while continuing to pursue development goals, the government decided to consolidate its 
plethora of ineffective and inefficient social programs into a single CCT in 2002. 
B. PATH 
In developing PATH, the government found that it was operating 54 social safety 
net programs spread across 12 ministries.94 As was the case in Chile, many of the 
intended beneficiaries were not properly targeted and administration proved to be 
woefully inefficient. For many, services were duplicated or provided on an inconsistent 
basis. Thus, the government liquidated most of these programs in the 1999 Social Safety 
Net Reform, but resolved to combine three whose primary constituency were the socially 
vulnerable, Food Stamp, Old Age and Incapacity Allowance, and Outdoor Poor Relief, 
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into PATH. Since the programs were already in existence, and their consolidation was a 
cost saving measure of the center-left government, the institution of PATH did not face 
significant political resistance. To ensure the program would be applicable island-wide, it 
was first deployed as a pilot in St. Catherine Parish in November 2001. The parish 
provided a solid mix of urban, suburban, and rural populations where different targeting 
and implementation methods and process improvements could be tested.95 The program 
was instituted island-wide by the end of 2002. 
C. CONDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND ENFORCEMENT 
As in Brazil, PATH focuses on two areas, health and education enhancement, as 
the primary avenues to human capital improvement and poverty and income inequality 
eradication. Consequently, the architects of the program conditioned the cash transfer on 
fulfilling education and health requirements. The education condition is similar to Bolsa 
Família in that it requires attendance of 85% of school days per month regardless of 
grade for all children six years and older. The school must also be government funded, as 
attendance at a private school assumes the student does not need PATH benefits even if 
they are poor. The health conditions exceed that of either Bolsa Família or Solidario in its 
reach. Where those programs place emphasis on early childhood health, pre and antenatal 
mothers, and disabled persons to the exclusion of adults of prime working age, PATH 
includes them. All adults enrolled in the program, regardless of age and the presence or 
lack of disability, are required to receive at least one health visit every six months. 
Pregnant women are must receive checkups once every two months during pregnancy 
while lactating mothers must attend six weeks and two months after childbirth. Children 
six months and younger must have a visit at least once every two months. Finally, 
children seven to 72 months must attend a health visit once every six months.96 A major 
factor in PATH is that a beneficiary cannot receive both the health and education benefits 
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simultaneously. This is clearly to encourage school attendance for children old enough to 
go. Though the monetary incentive to attend health checkups is gone for the child, poor 
guardians will still receive theirs, and, it is hoped, bring their charges along.  
To put PATH’s payment regime in perspective, the minimum wage in Jamaica is 
J$24,260 (Jamaican dollars) a month. The poverty line island-wide is J$9,170 a month as 
of 2010, the last time official data was collected.97 PATH does not differentiate payment 
based on poverty level. However, the payments get larger as recipients age through 
different categories. Additionally, payments are made every two months rather than every 
month, as is the case in other CCTs. According to Jamaica’s Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security, eligible children six years and younger can receive the Health Benefit, 
J$750 per month.98 All other categories of eligible recipients get J$900. The second 
category of payment, Education Grants, provides money based on the grade level and 
gender of the recipient child. Male children in grades one through nine receive J$100 
more than female children and J$115 more in grades 10 to 13. Since males are less likely 
to be enrolled in school, the additional money provides a boy’s guardian with a greater 
incentive to comply with the education conditions.99 Female children receive J$750 in 
grades one to six, J$975 in grades seven to nine, and J$1,150 in grades 10 to 13.  
A unique component of PATH is its post-secondary education grants. 
Implemented in Fall 2009, the grant is intended to aid recipient children who are accepted 
into one of the island’s tertiary education institutions. It is a one-time payment ranging 
from J$15,000 to J$50,000 depending on the type of credential a student is pursuing, 
which ranges from vocational trade certifications to bachelor’s degrees. There are no 
health and education conditions beyond the initial qualifying requirements. However, 
recipients are obligated to work in the island’s public sector for at least five years after 
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completing their studies and do some form of community service. In 2012, the 
government created the PATH Tertiary Scholarship, piloting it to 13 students then 
expanding it to 1,000 high achieving PATH students in 2013.100  The scholarship is 
worth J$100,000, but is limited to college and university students. The grant and the 
scholarship indicate that the Jamaican government recognizes that retaining the island’s 
high achieving youth, particularly those coming from poverty, is critical to improving its 
long-term human capital. Moreover, such students serve as role models and information 
conduits to other impoverished children through their community service requirement.   
Conditional compliance is exercised through the suspension of funds for 
violations. In lieu of the full benefit amount, violators will receive only J$400 until they 
are in compliance. Levy and Ohls discovered, however, that the process of suspension 
and reinstatement had considerable flaws.101 Using recipient focus groups and interviews 
with officials from schools and the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, the authors 
found that approximately 10% of children had been suspended at one time or another 
mostly for not attending school, due mostly to lack of transportation. The majority of 
parents disputed the suspension, arguing that the fault lay in Ministry recordkeeping and 
oversight of its parish offices.102 Teachers contended that the fault was with both the 
Ministry and the parents who were often slow in informing the schools and Ministry 
offices of why their child was not at school. 
D. REGISTRATION AND TARGETING 
A primary mission of PATH is to accurately identify those Jamaicans who are 
impoverished. Since it is a larger program as a portion of population affected, it cannot 
use the highly articulated approach of Solidario and its 53 conditions. However, PATH 
does use a scaled down version known as proxy means testing, where other factors such 
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as housing situation and access to clean water and electricity are included along with 
monetary income in determining if a household is poor. Using this testing method, 
prospective PATH recipients are prioritized based on those most in need. In the first 
years of the program, this testing method proved crucial. As Levy and Ohls point out, just 
58% of PATH recipients were monetarily poor by Jamaican standards at the time of their 
study in 2009.103 This implies that poverty for much of the rest of the 42% of recipients 
was expressed in some other form that was identified in the proxy means tests. The 
authors further explored this implication when they examined the definition of poverty as 
a measure of consumption in country. They determined that if poverty was defined as 
being below the 25
th
 percentile of consumption in the country, then the poor constituted 
63% of PATH recipients. Though recipients can remain in PATH in perpetuity, social 
works conduct periodic assessments to determine if a family still meets the proxy means 
test limits. Those that are deemed no longer in need are then graduated out of the 
program. However, a graduated family can apply for reentry if their poverty situation 
worsens. 
PATH has only recently been fully resourced to service the greater percentage of 
Jamaicans who fall below the poverty line. Levy and Ohls reported that at the time they 
were collecting data for their study just 106,000 of the 520,000 poor were receiving 
PATH benefits.104 At that time, the poverty rate was 20%. Additionally, the authors note 
that even if PATH had been funded to its full mandate of 236,000 people, only 45% of 
the poor would have been covered. Since then, a combination of cash infusions from the 
World Bank and increased spending by the government pushed the number of those 
covered by PATH to 360,000 in June 2008, helping to cushion the blow of the global 
financial crisis on Jamaica’s poor.105 At present, there are poor 368,704 beneficiaries in 
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the program, which though lower than the 2013 number of 388,187, far exceeds the 
original mandate.106  
Taken in this context, the value of proxy means tests in determining who is poor 
beyond sheer monetary factors is made clear. For a heavily indebted country like 
Jamaica, which has to economize its limited discretionary spending, it is critically 
important that social programs like PATH are targeted in such a way that they have the 
most impact on the people who most require them. Thus, the Jamaican government, like 
their Brazilian counterparts, has chosen to use the data and lessons learned from PATH 
registration to identify enrollees for future programs and improve the targeting of current 
social programs like its School Feeding Program. 
E. IMPACT 
1. Education 
PATH’s impact on educational outcomes is mixed. As stated before, the overall 
attendance rate of Jamaica’s schools hovered at around 85% when the program was 
implemented, which left little room for large improvements. Moreover, there has been no 
marked improvement in male attendance rates since PATH has been implemented, which 
makes it hard to justify the stratified Education Benefit.  
In their evaluation of PATH, Levy and Ohls found that attendance rates for 
recipients increased by 3% over the time of the time of the study.107 While this is a small 
number, it is significant given that Jamaica already had high attendance rates. However, 
Lavigne and Hernán Vargas found that while attendance rates did improve, enrollment 
data showed mixed results. There was good improvement overall in the education system 
between 1999 and 2010, with a jump from 79.3% to 84.2% of children enrolled in 
                                                 
106 Francesca Lamanna, Jamaica – Social Protection Project: P105024 – Implementation Status 
Results Report: Sequence 12, (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2014), 2, http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/LCR/2014/07/12/090224b082584755/1_0/
Rendered/PDF/Jamaica000Soci0Report000Sequence012.pdf.  
107 Levy and Ohls, “Evaluation of Jamaica’s PATH Conditional Cash Transfer Programme,” 15–6.  
 50 
school.108 Likewise, enrollment in secondary schools remained steady, increasing only by 
one to 83.6% over the decade, though female numbers increased by 3.8 to 86.8% while 
male numbers dropped by 2 to 80.4%. For primary school enrollment, there was actually 
a large decrease by eight points to 82% between 1999 and 2010. There is no data to 
account for the drop in primary enrollment, and this trend is of particular concern to the 
Jamaican government. Given that male PATH recipients get a larger disbursement to 
encourage them to be in school, it is surprising that female students outperform them. Not 
only are they more likely to be enrolled and attend school, female children also repeat 
grades at a lower rate in both primary and secondary school than their male counterparts, 
though grade repetition has improved for both sexes.109 Thus, it appears that there is no 
justification for a stratified benefit structure.  
There have yet to be any studies conducted on the progress of the tertiary 
education grants and scholarships since they are new additions to PATH. However, the 
fact that the Jamaican government has taken steps to provide fair opportunities to talented 
poor children and recognized the need to maintain their talents on-island is an 
encouraging sign for the long-term development of the human capital. 
2. Health 
Jamaica possesses a relatively good healthcare system, with wide coverage of its 
population. As with the education outcomes, however, health outcomes are mixed. While 
children were most impacted, no other age group showed any significant change in health 
status.  
For the children eligible to receive the Health Benefit, those six years old and 
younger, there was a 38% increase in the number of clinical visits.110 All other age 
groups and lactating and pregnant mothers reported no significant change in the number 
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of clinical visits they made. This may be a function of how well the Jamaican health 
system covers the population as a whole and their usage of the health system particularly 
the poor. As Lavigne and Hernán Vargas found, 65% of the island’s public health 
customers come from the poorest population sectors.111 Jamaica’s health system is fully 
subsidized by the government and has no user fees, which makes access easier. 
Moreover, PATH does not penalize the elderly for not attending conditional visits, which 
is significant given that they make up 19% of all program beneficiaries. Finally, PATH 
appears to not have any impact on long-term health indicators like such as vaccinations. 
Monchuk found no significant difference between PATH and non-PATH elderly 
preventative care practices or child immunization rates, which were high before the 
program’s implementation.112 Again, this appears to be a function of how well the 
island’s healthcare system reaches the population. 
3. Poverty and Inequality 
As stated before, Jamaica is a rare example of a heavily indebted country with a 
stagnant economy that achieved an impressive reduction in poverty rate. It suffers from a 
GDP per capita rate that has not changed appreciably since 1990, while the inflation rate 
risen. Unemployment also remains stubbornly high. As a result, it is difficult to determine 
how much PATH has impacted poverty and inequality.  
Like Solidario, PATH’s effect on poverty has been most evident among the 
extremely poor. Fiszbein and Schady determined in their exhaustive survey of CCTs that 
the squared poverty gap, the difference between the poor and destitute, was reduced by 
13% from 2002 to 2005 due to PATH.113 No data has been found that show how much 
the program has reduced overall poverty. Indeed the poverty rate has remained nearly 
constant with the exception of 2007, where it dropped steeply from 14% to 10% before 
increasing to 16.5% in 2009.114 An indicator of how PATH is impacting the poverty and 
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inequality is increased consumption. Since the implementation of the program, 
consumption amongst   quintiles one and two, 39% and 33% respectively, has increased 
relative to the two wealthiest quintiles, 31% and 25% respectively.115 Additionally, 
PATH has a mechanism that protects recipients from the island’s volatile inflation by 
increasing benefit payments if inflation exceeds 8% in a given year.116 
Finally, long-term poverty and inequality outcomes are difficult to project. 
Because of Jamaica’s inability to grow economically and its indebtedness, the poverty 
and unemployment rate will continue to persist. However, the government, taking a cue 
from Chile and Brazil, is the population data and implantation lessons learned from 
PATH to mainstream a pilot jobs training program geared specifically to PATH 
recipients called Steps-to-Work. As yet, no analytical data is available to assess how well 
the program is doing. As is the case with the tertiary education grants and scholarships, 
Steps-to-Work is a clear indication that Jamaica recognizes that improving the work force 
is critical to resolving its economic morass. If the enrollees in Steps-to-Work can acquire 
gainful, formal employment, the tax base can be expanded, reducing the shadow 
economy and capturing much need government funding. 
F. CONCLUSION 
PATH has become an important part of Jamaica’s efforts to improve its human 
capital. Indeed it has become so important that it is protected from any social welfare 
restructuring requirements that normally come attached to IMF loans. As a national 
program, it touches large part of the population and over 80% of the poor population. The 
program has had mild impacts on health and educational improvement, particularly 
among Jamaica’s impoverished children, who make up 80% of the program. While its 
incentive structure has managed to coax an additional 3% out of the attendance rate in a 
country whose poor children already go to school at a relatively high rate and improve 
overall enrollment in schools, it has had no impact on primary school enrollment. 
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Additionally, the stratified education benefit that pays male students more than females is 
not sufficient to improve boys’ performance, enrollment, or attendance, as they continue 
to be outclassed by their female counterparts. With regard to health outcomes, PATH has 
been able to drastically increase the health visits for young children. Though the same 
cannot be said for the other age groups eligible for the health benefit or for preventative 
health practices like vaccinations, the data indicates that this is not so much a flaw in 
PATH as it is a display of how effective the Jamaican public health system is. Moreover, 
developing good health practice early in life may improve the chance that they will be 
maintained as a child ages. The program’s impact on poverty and inequality, while not 
readily apparent, is shown through increased consumption among the poorest sectors 
relative to the wealthier portions of the population. Additionally, the sizable reduction of 
indigence shows that, at least for the very poorest, PATH is having a large positive affect 
on their economic situation. 
Finally, though short-term outcomes have been mixed and long-term predictions 
are difficult to make, Jamaica has shown that it is committed to PATH as the prime 
mover in improving its human capital overtime. Recent additions to the program like the 
tertiary education grant and scholarships and spin-off schemes like Steps-to-Work are 
proof of this.  
 
 54 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 55 
V. FINDINGS SUMMARY AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is a general principle of economics that when the absolute productive limits of 
capital and labor are reached, the only way to increase output is by improving a 
production system’s total factor inputs. These inputs come in the form of capital 
enhancements through technological innovation and labor enhancements through 
education and health improvements. The principle of the “double movement,” elegantly 
proposed by Polanyi, says that market liberalism, left unchecked, will cause society to be 
“subjugated to the economy and run as an adjunct to the market. This is contrary to 
traditional forms of human organization, where markets and the economy are an 
integrated part of society and economic motives are submerged in social principles such 
as reciprocity and redistribution.”117 Therefore, protective countermeasures designed to 
reign in unfettered market liberalism must be put in place to maintain the supremacy of 
human society over economics. It is these roles, improving labor and societal protection, 
which CCTs seek to fill.  
This thesis has sought to examine CCT program operated in three countries –
Brazil, Chile, and Jamaica – that have vastly different social, political, and economic 
characteristics. In selecting the countries, I hoped to understand how these characteristics 
informed the manner in which the respective CCTs targeted and selected potential 
recipients; their conditions and how they were enforced; and their impacts on human 
capital, poverty, and inequality. Despite the relative newness of these programs as anti-
poverty schemes and the lack of data with respect to long-term outcomes, some general 
observations and policy recommendations can be made. 
A. FINDINGS 
First, each CCT has been designed within the socio-political and economic 
context of its parent country. Ever since its transition from authoritarianism in the late 
1980s, Brazil has been led by left-leaning politicians. The government has taken a very 
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active role in the economy, using revenues from its stock shares and high taxes to 
institute and finance social policies popular with its citizenry. Thus, Bolsa Família, due to 
its vast reach and role in reducing the number of impoverished Brazilians, is widely 
supported by even opponents of the left-leaning PT government. Moreover, Bolsa 
Família’s popular appeal has made it easier for the government to institute more social 
programs, ranging from eased credit standards to heavily subsidized mortgages for 
government-built housing.  
In Chile, though it too has been dominated by left-leaning governments since its 
transition to democracy in 1990, a tradition of free-market economics has shaped its 
Solidario program. Instead of instituting a vast CCT in the form of Bolsa Família, Chile 
chose a more targeted, niche program designed to service only the extremely poor. 
Instead, of giving large cash transfers upon which recipients can subsist, Solidario seeks 
to make more efficient use of existing social protection mechanisms and provide 
opportunities for recipients to work their way out of indigence. Finally, where Bolsa 
Família and PATH allow enrollees to remain part of the system in perpetuity, Solidario 
limits enrollment to five years, thus preventing reliance and providing an added incentive 
to actively fulfill program conditions. 
Jamaica, plagued by economic stagnation and indebted for most of its 
independence, has also couched its CCT scheme in the realities of its socio-political and 
economic circumstances. Instead of increasing the number of social programs like Brazil 
or keeping the status quo like Chile, Jamaica chose, because of its fiscal restraints, to 
combine several programs into one. This has helped the government more accurately 
identify those in need. Though PATH does not have the sweeping impacts on its targeted 
population that the other two CCTs examined here do, the ability to accurately target its 
poor has allowed it to institute new programs to better attack two great impediments to its 
economic success, namely, high unemployment and the resulting lost tax revenues and 
the migration of many of talented citizens overseas. Steps-to-Work and the tertiary 
education grants and scholarships are new components of PATH that will warrant future 
study. 
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Second, each CCT has conditions and enforcement mechanisms appropriate to the 
needs of their respective populations. Even in Chile and Jamaica, where the conditional 
requirements are muted somewhat by each country’s widely used health care system and 
high school attendance rate, there has been positive, if mild, impacts on health and 
education outcomes. The enforcement mechanisms are also appropriate and grounded in 
the societal traditions of each country. Chile may not punish households for not fulfilling 
their contracts, but the time limitation of the program has ensured fairly high compliance 
rates. In Jamaica, compliance with the education condition has proven to be a recurring 
problem. Flaws caused by faulty recordkeeping and information breakdown between the 
parish PATH offices, schools, and guardians. However, benefits are not totally suspended 
and there is no permanent suspension. In this manner, the government ensures that 
suspended persons are not totally alienated from the program and can take measures to 
regain their benefits. Brazil, on the other hand, does suspend repeat offenders, but offers 
those who return to compliance all of their missed benefits, thus avoiding a total break 
between the state and the citizen.  
Targeting and registration methods are well constructed in all countries, if not 
perfectly executed in Brazil and Jamaica. Solidario proved to be the best targeted and 
registered program. This is not surprising given its relatively small constituency and its 
method of determining who should be enrolled. Bolsa Família and PATH, too, did a good 
job of targeting prospective recipients. This is particularly true of the Jamaicans, who did 
not have the infrastructure to execute Solidario-style targeting, but used proxy means 
testing as an accurate method for the sake of insuring efficiency in identifying those most 
in need regardless of monetary income. However, the program covers just 80% of those 
who live below the poverty line. With regards to Bolsa Família, targeting was done well 
in the poorest regions of the country, the rural north and Amazon, but less so in the urban 
south. However, the targeting and registration regime, like that of Jamaica, has proven 
quite valuable for targeting more wide-ranging social programs. 
Third, the impacts on health, education, poverty and inequality outcomes were 
generally mixed for each CCT. With respect to education, both Bolsa Família and PATH 
played positive, though small, roles in increasing school attendance among recipient 
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children. Neither program appeared to affect matriculation rates. Moreover, the stratified 
education benefit of PATH did not improve performance of male children versus female 
children. Solidario’s impact was reflected more in the increased usage of available 
education programs, especially adult literacy.  
Health outcomes were likewise mixed, but positive. Since Chile and Jamaica have 
health systems with fairly good coverage and usage rates, there was no significant change 
in behavior, especially among elderly PATH users. However, clinic visits rates for young 
children were high in all cases. Brazil shows some very positive long-term indications, 
with children no longer required to attend health visits continuing to do so with no 
monetary incentive.  
The impact of the three CCT programs on poverty and inequality varied greatly. 
All showed great reductions in the rates of indigence, especially Chile’s. They all also 
showed the ability to reduce inequality, though it is still quite high in Brazil and Chile. 
Brazil’s overall poverty rate fell, but not the number of poor people, which suggests that 
people are entering the program at a constant rate as they are exiting. PATH has shown 
the least ability to reduce the poverty rate, even as the number of enrollees has more than 
doubled since 2002, more than either other CCT. Jamaica’s poverty rate has managed to 
remain stagnant. 
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
At the time of this thesis, each nation has undertaken some changes to the way it 
operates its CCTs to improve the impacts on human capital and poverty reduction. As 
stated before, Brazil and Jamaica are using their registry databases and targeting tools to 
identify participants of additional programs that have potential long-term impacts. 
However, I believe some changes can be made to the existing programs. An expansion of 
the education conditions for both programs may be helpful. Both have shown an inability 
to improve student matriculation while improving attendance. Clearly, just being in 
school cannot alone improve the quality of the education. I recommend an additional 
incentive structure be instituted that rewards children for improved academic 
performance. The amount of the bonus should be based on the performance mark: the 
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higher the mark, the higher the payment. I believe PATH’s tertiary education grants and 
scholarships are a promising, and logical, extension of the CCT, also allowing the 
program to track the academic progress of recipients beyond their teenage years. I 
recommend Brazil and Chile adopt a similar model as an extra incentive for 
underperforming recipient children to do well. Like the Jamaicans, the other countries 
can require those who accept the grants and scholarships to serve in some public 
capacity, whether it is community service or government employment. I recognize that 
this may be antithetical to the Chilean context. However, it can be styled to give high 
performance indigent students preferred access to scholarship and grant programs while 
remaining a time-limited scheme. 
As stated before, Brazil and Jamaica do a good job of targeting, but have 
significant gaps in coverage. To remedy this, I recommend an increase in program 
quotas. For Brazil, this will require an increase in the amount of the transfer. As the 
research showed, at least 3.4 million children under 17 years of age are working rather 
than attending school. Additionally, I recommend payments be made by family rather 
than household. This would have a greater impact in the southern cities where the cost of 
living forces many young mothers and fathers to live with their parents. In Jamaica, 
despite the additional indicators of poverty provided by proxy means testing, 20% of 
those living below the poverty line are not part of PATH. While this may present a 
problem given Jamaica’s budget constraints, the government has shown the willingness 
and ability to expand the program before. 
In the coming years, more social programs derived from these CCTs will begin to 
have an impact on each country’s human capital and poverty rates. In Brazil, the 
expansion of Bolsa Família, known as Plan Brazil Without Misery, will be geared 
specifically to extremely poor children who have not been captured by current social 
programs. In Jamaica, the first participants of the Steps-to-Work job training program and 
the tertiary education grants and scholarships will be graduating. By tracking their 
progress as they enter into the workforce, the long-term implications of these programs 
will become available. Finally, since Solidario was instituted in 2002, at least four 
cohorts of participants should have exited the program. There are research opportunities 
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in tracking their continued progress in 53 conditions of the program now that they are no 
longer receiving the information and attention from a dedicated social worker. 
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APPENDIX 
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR CHILE SOLIDARIO BY GROUPING 
 
Identification 
1. All family members are registered in the Civil Registry. 
2. All family members have an identification card. 
3. The family has its CAS (social assistance data) updated at its municipality of 
residence. 
4. All men over 18 are documented as having their eligibility for military service 
resolved. 
5. All adult family members have updated their identity information as appropriate. 
i.e., marriage certificates. 
6. All family members with disabilities are certified and registered with the National 




1. Family is registered in the Primary Health Care service. 
2. Pregnant women have regular health checks. 
3. Children 6 years old and younger have updated vaccinations. 
4. Children 6 years old and younger have regular health checks. 
5. Women 35 years and older have updated PAP test. 
6. Women using birth control do so with medical supervision. 
7. The elderly have adequate medical supervision. 
8. Family members with chronic illnesses are under medical supervision. 
9. Family members with disabilities that can be rehabilitated are participating in a 
rehabilitation program. 




1. Preschool aged children attend a nursery school program. 
2. Children with single, working parents and no other adult available to care for 
them receive adequate child care. 
3. Children 15 years and younger attend school. 
4. Children attending nursery, primary, or secondary school benefit from assistance 
programs as appropriate. 
5. Children 12 years and older are literate. 
6. Children with disabilities who are able to study do so in a regular or special 
educational institution. 
7. There is an adult responsible for a child’s education and has regular interaction 
with the school. 
 62 
8. Adults have positive and responsible attitude towards education, and emphasizes 
the importance of education to children. 




1. Families should discuss daily topics like habits, schedules, and recreation. 
2. The family has adequate mechanisms to deal with conflicts. 
3. The family has clear rules. 
4. Household tasks are divided fairly regardless of sex. 
5. The family is informed about, and networked into, community services and 
development programs. 
6. In the event of domestic violence, involved parties are enrolled in support 
programs. 
7. Families with children placed in foster care or state institution visit said children 
regularly. 
8. Families with a child in the penal system provide support for the child and 




1. The family has a clear housing situation regarding land and home ownership or 
leasing agreement. 
2. Families seeking housing assistance should be actively applying. 
3. Homes should have access to clean water. 
4. Homes should have proper plumbing. 
5. Homes should have adequate power systems. 
6. Homes should be leak-proof and flood resistance. 
7. Homes should have at least two habitable rooms. 
8. Each family member should have a bed with basic sheeting. 
9. Each home should be equipped with basic cooking and eating equipment. 
10. Homes should have adequate garbage disposal. 
11. Homes should be free of environmental pollution. 




1. At least one adult family member has steady employment and payment. 
2. No child 15 years or younger drops out of school to work. 




1. Family members eligible for the Family Support Subsidy are receiving it. 
2. Family members eligible for Social Security Assistance are receiving it. 
 63 
3. Families eligible for the Family Allowance are receiving it. 
4. Family income is above the poverty line. 
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